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The Dark Side of Transparency in Developing Countries: 






This paper examines the impact of financial reporting practices on corruption obstacles for about 
150,000 firms across 143 mostly developing countries from 2006–2019. We document a strong 
positive relationship between the production of audited financial statements (AFS) and corruption 
obstacles (CO) faced by the firm. We argue that in a corrupt business environment, rent-seeking 
bureaucrats use the credible financial information to optimize their bribe demands. Our baseline 
results remain robust after addressing endogeneity concerns. We further show that country-level 
institutional quality has a moderating effect on the AFS-CO relation. The evidence from surveying 
entrepreneurs also provides qualitative support for our empirical findings. Our study sheds light on 
a previously under-explored adverse consequence of transparency - exposure to corrupt bureaucrats 
where institutions are weak. 
 
JEL Classification: M42, G32, D73   
Key Words: Audited financial statements; Transparency; Private firms; Corruption obstacles 
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“[E]mbezzle according to one’s rank.” 
-- Russian adage from Cadot (1987) 
 
1. Introduction 
A scene from a New York mob movie could go like this. Big Tuna, the collector, goes to 
Frankie, the shopkeeper, to collect “protection money.” Frankie demurs, “Boss, times are tough. 
Please cut me some slack.” Big Tuna doesn’t skip a beat, “Frankie, don’t be stupid! We know 
exactly how much you pulled in this month.” Haplessly looking at Big Tuna, Frankie reluctantly 
opens a drawer and hands over a pre-bundled roll of cash. Big Tuna taps Frankie’s shoulder twice, 
and says “Good boy,” before walking toward a bakery across the street. 
 In developing countries with weak institutions and resulting rampant public corruption, 
rent-seeking bureaucrats behave like Big Tunas.1 They gather and utilize information to maximize 
the nature and amount of their harassment, subject to the constraints that the firm might exit or 
they might be caught (Bliss and Tella, 1997; Svensson, 2003, 2005; Fisman and Svensson, 2007). 
In a dynamic corruption model under different information sets (perfect, imperfect, and incomplete 
information), Cadot (1987) shows that corrupt behaviors are directly linked to the information sets 
of the players. He further shows that corrupt officials and bribers derive their Nash strategies based 
on the information sets they possess. Specifically, he shows that high-ranking officials are able to 
collect more bribes due to their more complete information sets, thus they “embezzle according to 
one’s rank” (Cadot, 1987, p. 240). Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) analyze a disclosure model by 
firms and show that disclosure is costly and that the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure 
game is often socially inefficient. Durnev and Guriev (2011) also develop a model that shows 
increased corporate transparency exposes firms to rent-seeking bureaucrats. Johnson et al. (1998) 
also argue that the high costs associated with corruption and bureaucracy can drive private 
businesses underground.  
Despite extensive theoretical studies showing that costs are associated with increased 
information production, empirical evidence at the firm level is limited, and empirical evidence 
from developing countries is even scarcer. In this study, we examine the financial reporting 
practices of private firms in developing countries. Specifically, we investigate the relation between 
a firm’s financial reporting practices and the associated costs (the dark side) as proxied by firm-
 
1 For papers and surveys on the literature of corruption, see Bardhan (1997), Cai et al. (2011), Clarke and Xu (2004), 
Li et al. (2000), Mauro (1995), Murphy et al. (1993), and Svensson (2003, 2005).  
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level corruption obstacles, that is, whether Frankie’s financial reporting practices have an impact 
on Big Tuna’s demand for “protection money.”   
We focus on private sector firms in developing countries for two reasons. First, private 
sector plays an increasingly important role in developing economies around the world and there is 
compelling evidence that the private sector is critical to economic growth in these countries. Until 
2014, the private sector provided about 90% of employment in the developing world. Furthermore, 
the private sector funded 60% of investment and contributed more than 80% of government 
revenue in low- and middle-income countries.2 Compared with the large literature on developed 
countries’ accounting systems and managers’ reporting incentives, financial reporting of private 
firms in developing countries is highly underexplored in the literature (Chen et al., 2011). Second 
and more importantly, a growing literature suggests that corruption is often high in developing 
countries as bureaucrats in developing countries are less constrained than their counterparts in the 
developed world (Svensson, 2005; Olken and Pande, 2012). In addition, the costs of corruption in 
these countries can be severe, as corruption may decrease business activities and lead to inefficient 
outcomes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Mauro, 1995; Murphy et al., 1993; Wei, 2000; Svensson, 
2003, 2005; Olken and Pande, 2012). This setting is particularly relevant in our study, as we argue 
that when corrupt officials are unconstrained, they will find ways to access and abuse firms’ 
audited financial information for personal gains.  
Using World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data from 2006–2019 for about 150,000 
firms in 143 mostly developing countries,3 we examine the impact of the production of audited 
financial statements (hence forth AFS) on corruption obstacles (CO) faced by the firm. We 
document that AFS firms are associated with a significantly higher level of CO than non-AFS firms. 
Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm-level controls, macro-level controls, and industry, year, 
and country fixed effects.  
 We acknowledge the endogenous nature of our key variable, AFS. To alleviate the 
endogeneity concerns, we employ several strategies, including an instrumental variable (IV) 
analysis, a panel data analysis with firm fixed effects to control for any unobservable firm 
 




3 Our sample also includes a few mid-income/developed countries, such as Slovenia, South Korea, and Sweden.  
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characteristics, a regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis with mandatory country-level 
audit thresholds, and a qualitative analysis (i.e. an unstructured survey of business owners). Our 
baseline results remain robust after we run the aforementioned empirical robustness tests.4 An 
unstructured survey of business owners also provides qualitative support to our hypothesis that 
increased disclosure of accounting information bears costs in the form of an increased level of 
corruption obstacles faced by the firm.5   
To understand how AFS might affect CO, we investigate four variables that arise from the 
interactions between firms and bureaucrats: business license obstacles, customs obstacles, the 
percent of senior management’s time spent on government regulations, and tax inspections. Our 
results show that AFS is positively associated with all the four variables. These results are 
consistent with the notion that bureaucrats’ rent-seeking opportunities are positively linked to 
access to firms’ detailed financial information.  
We further investigate how country-level institutional development affects the AFS-CO 
relationship and document a stronger (weaker) relation between AFS and CO in countries with a 
weak (strong) corruption control mechanisms. These results provide further evidence that 
considerable costs are associated with the production of detailed and credible financial information, 
especially in countries where institutions are underdeveloped and bureaucrats are less constrained. 
 Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, and most importantly, our 
main finding that AFS is linked to higher corruption obstacles at the firm level demonstrates that 
transparency bears significant costs by exposing the firm to corrupt officials. The existing 
empirical literature concerning the consequences of financial disclosure has largely focused on the 
reduction of information asymmetry between firms and non-governmental outside stakeholders. 
A general finding is that the decrease in information asymmetry reduces the cost of external 
financing and thus enhances firm investment efficiency (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Verrecchia, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2003; Fan and Wong, 2005; Khurana et al., 2006; 
Guedhami and Pittman, 2006; Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007; Guedhami et al., 2009; 
Francis et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Hope et al., 2011; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Despite the 
large volume of literature documenting the benefits of financial transparency, empirical evidence 
 
4 We also employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method to alleviate endogeneity concerns. The PSM results, 
which are not presented in the main text to save space, support the positive relationship between AFS and CO.  
5 See Section 5.4 and Table 6 for details about our survey and interview responses.  
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on the associated costs is limited. Our finding regarding the dark side of exposing firms to 
government expropriation is novel and rarely explored empirically in the literature. 
Second, our study helps fill a literature gap that private firms’ financial reporting practices 
in developing countries and their consequences are largely unexplored in the literature, as 
emphasized in Chen et al. (2011) and Cassar (2011). Several papers study financial reporting 
practices of private firms in developed countries. Using the U.S. Employing survey data from 
4,004 small privately held U.S. firms from 2003-2004, Allee and Yohn (2009) examine the factors 
associated with the production and use of unaudited financial statements, audited financial 
statements, and accrual-based financial statements. The authors show that firms with audited 
financial statements have better access to credit than those without. These results show that the 
sophistication of financial statements plays an important role in lowering financial constraints 
among privately held small firms in the U.S. Similarly, Minnis (2011) examines a large sample of 
privately held U.S. firms and documents that firms with AFS experience significantly lower cost 
of debt than those with unaudited financial statements. More recently, Minnis and his coauthors 
show that lenders (banks) use AFS as an effective monitoring and information gathering 
mechanism (Minnis and Sutherland, 2017; see also, Berger et al., 2017). Unlike these studies that 
focus on the benefits of increased financial disclosure in private firms in the United States, we 
focus on the associated costs borne by private firms in developing countries. Given that a large 
majority of firms in our sample are not mandated to produce AFS, the results presented in this 
paper enhance our understanding of private firms’ financial disclosure decisions and the associated 
costs in developing countries.6   
Third, our paper adds to the literature that examines the costs associated with information 
production in developed countries. Focusing on U.S. firms, DeAngelo (1988) examines the costs 
associated with the use of accounting information in proxy fights in U.S. listed firms. Guo et al. 
(2004) investigate the competitive costs associated with product-related information disclosed in 
IPO prospectuses. Berger and Hann (2007) examine the proprietary costs and agency costs 
associated with segment profit information disclosure in U.S. listed firms. The costs examined in 
these studies are borne by the interactions between firms and non-government outside stakeholders, 
 
6 In our sample, a small number of private firms are required to produce audited financial statements because some 
countries have policies that require firms to audit their financial statements if they meet certain disclosure thresholds 
such as total assets or number of employees. See Section 5.3 and Internet Appendix Table IA3 for more details.    
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such as capital market participants and competitors. On the other hand, the cost examined in our 
paper arises from the interactions between firms and government bureaucrats, which are especially 
consequential in developing countries.7 
Finally, we document that a country’s institutional quality plays an important role in 
impacting the AFS-CO relation. The quality of both governance and institutions have been shown 
to  significantly affect firm-level corporate policies and outcomes (La Porta et al., 2000; Lemmon 
and Lins, 2003; Doidge et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2009; Durnev et al., 2009; Durnev and Fauver, 
2011; Harrison et al., 2014, among others). However, the empirical literature has not paid enough 
attention to how institutional quality affects firm-level costs associated with financial reporting 
practices. Our study helps fill the gap. Indeed, the dependence of the AFS effect on institutional 
background nicely illustrates the complementarity between information disclosure and the 
underlying institutional background, which is vastly underexplored in the literature but 
emphasized by Leuz and Wysocki (2008) in their survey.  
Our paper is also related to Durnev et al. (2009) who employ data from 69 countries to 
examine the effect of transparency on firm growth at the industry level. They find that in countries 
with secure property rights, corporate transparency improves investment efficiency and increases 
firm growth by lowering information asymmetry. However, in countries with insecure property 
rights, greater transparency increases the risk of government expropriation, leading some firms to 
adopt sub-optimal transparency levels (Johnson et al., 1998). At the firm level, Durnev and Fauver 
(2011) examine a sample of over 20,000 publicly listed firms from 46 countries and find a negative 
link between the expropriation risk and the degree of information disclosure. They find that in 
countries with high expropriation risk, firms are discouraged from practicing good governance and 
choose to disclose less information to avoid government expropriation. Our study complements 
Durnev et al. (2009) and Durnev and Fauver (2011) in two crucial respects. First, the 
aforementioned papers examine listed firms, whereas our sample focuses on private firms. As 
pointed out earlier, publicly listed firms and private firms face very different market and regulatory 
pressures that shape their financial reporting decisions. Second, we examine the relationship 
 
7 Two studies find that transparency leads to lower level of corruption. Peisakhin (2012) examines the impact of 
India’s version of Freedom of Information Act (RITA) on bribery and finds that the enactment of RITA in 2005 leads 
to lower incidence of bribery. Akins et al. (2017) find that banks’ improved financial reporting reduces lending 
corruption. Specifically, the authors show that more-timely loan loss provisioning leads to earlier detection of lending 
corruption. 
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between AFS and CO from very different angles. Durnev et al. (2009) and Durnev et al. (2011) 
study the effect of expropriation risk on firm disclosure policies, whereas our paper examines the 
opposite direction of the causal relationship, that is, the impact of firm disclosure policies (AFS) 
on CO faced by firms.8  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews pertinent prior literature 
and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes data, variable definitions, and summary statistics. 
Section 4 examines the effect of AFS on CO, while Section 5 addresses potential endogeneity 
concerns. Section 6 discusses several specific channels through which corrupt officials could 
potentially use the disclosed financial information to optimize bribes. Section 7 examines the 
impact of institution quality on the AFS-CO relation, while Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
 Our paper is theoretically rooted in the information asymmetry thesis pioneered by George 
Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970). Information asymmetry exists as insiders know more about the 
characteristics and quality of their products than outside stakeholders. In an opaque information 
environment, good quality firms are unable to distinguish themselves from “lemons.” To alleviate 
this information asymmetry, outside stakeholders incur costs to gather and verify information 
about firm qualities. These costs will be passed on to the insiders eventually. Therefore, insiders 
in good quality firms have incentives to reduce information asymmetry. Otherwise, they will all 
be treated like “lemons” in the marketplace.  
The disclosure of financial reports reduces information asymmetry between firms and 
outside stakeholders. The main objective of an external audit is to provide a firm’s financial 
position to outside stakeholders such as equity investors and creditors.9 These outside stakeholders 
 
8 The fact that Durvev and Fauver (2011) find a negative relationship between increased expropriation risk and 
disclosure transparency helps strengthen our findings. If higher expropriation risk leads to lower information 
transparency as documented in Durvev and Fauver (2011), then firms that face higher corruption obstacles are likely 
to have less incentive to produce AFS. Therefore, this reverse causality would work against our finding a positive 
relation between AFS and CO. Despite this potential negative bias, we still find a positive and significant coefficient 
of AFS, supporting the robustness of our findings. 
9 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which sets financial reporting standards that have been 
adopted by many countries, states the main objective of financial reporting as follows: “The objective of general 
purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and 
potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those 
decisions involve buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling loans and other 
forms of credit.”  
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are economic agents who use the information to maximize their respective utilities. Equity 
investors use the information to gauge the risk-return tradeoff of the investment, while creditors 
use the information to examine the creditworthiness of the firm. As a result, the cost of market 
exchanges decreases, benefiting both outside stakeholders and firms (Williamson, 1985). Diamond 
(1985) develops a theory of voluntary information disclosure using publicly traded firms and 
shows that at equilibrium, disclosure improves the welfare of all traders more than non-disclosure. 
When firms choose their disclosure policies, they also consider potential costs associated 
with financial disclosure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). For example, the risk of 
government intervention and expropriation may affect the level of firm disclosure as firms that 
face a higher risk of state expropriation may act more opaquely. Stulz (2005) argues that country 
attributes and institutions affect firm-level financial decisions. The agency problem arising from 
the fact that both sovereign states and firm insiders attempt to squeeze out benefits from outsiders 
may prevent firms from benefiting from financial globalization. These “dual agency problems” 
help explain the variations in firm-level corporate decisions (including disclosure policies) across 
the globe.  
There are two main reasons that firms have their financial statements audited by external 
auditors. The first is a regulatory requirement triggered when the firm meets certain thresholds, 
such as number of employees or sales (see Section 6.3). The second reason is because they want 
to apply for external debt or attract new equity capital. The audited financial statements will be 
submitted to either government agencies or to banks that in developing countries, are largely state-
controlled. Therefore, voluntary or otherwise, the detailed and credible financial information 
contained in the audited statements will be more readily available for corrupt bureaucrats to exploit 
compared to firms that do not produce audited financial statements. 
In her seminal work on corruption, Rose-Ackerman (1975) models the destructive effect 
of corruption on economic growth. Johnson et al. (1998) advance corruption research empirically 
by showing that corruption leads to a larger unofficial economy. Their evidence also suggests that 
lax discretion in enforcing laws and undisciplined bureaucracies lead to weak supervision of 
officials. These conditions provide opportunities for corruption and that corruption, in turn, helps 
drive firms underground. Despite the fact that Johnson et al. (1998) examine the opposite direction 
of the causal relationship than we do and they examine the phenomenon at the macro level, their 
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finding that corruption has a direct impact on a firm’s transparency decisions is particularly 
relevant to our study.   
We expect that more transparency provides outsiders with information about firms’ 
revenue, profits, or cash holdings. Like the story we present at the beginning of our study, Big 
Tuna knew how much Frankie had made and embezzled accordingly. When firms increase their 
financial transparency, government officials may have a better idea about who should be extorted 
and how much can be extorted. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, we expect that the 
quality of governance and institutions will have an impact on firm-level disclosure policies and 
corruption obstacles. Based on the above discussions, we present our hypotheses as follows: 
 
H1: All else equal, higher the production of information, via audited financial statements (AFS), 
higher is the level of corruption obstacles faced by firms.  
 
H2: The strength of the link between firm corruption obstacles and AFS is stronger (weaker) in 
countries with relatively lower (higher) institution quality. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics  
3.1. The Data 
We construct firm-level variables from the WBES, which includes comprehensive firm-
level data collected for about 150,000 firms in 143 countries from 2006–2019.10 The WBES relies 
on standardized survey instruments in collecting firm-level data. Sample firms tend to be random 
samples from selected cities in each country, and thus the data cover (largely) private firms of all 
sizes. The survey respondents are mainly business owners and/or top managers at firms. The 
surveys focus on assessing the critical obstacles in the business environment that hinder firm 
growth, including access to finance and obstacles related to corruption, political instability, 
infrastructure, crime, competition, the labor market, and the legal system. The surveys also contain 
information on firm ownership, sales, employees, top manager’s work experience, whether a firm 
is an exporter, and firm age.   
 
10 Appendix 1 lists the total number of firm observations and the number and percentage of AFS firms and non-AFS 
firms by country. For a literature survey of firm-level studies using the WBES data, see Xu (2011). 
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Starting with all observations in the WBES, we delete firms that do not answer the audit 
question: “In the last fiscal year, did this establishment have its annual financial statement checked 
and certified by an external auditor?”  This question was answered by 148,199 firms in 143 
countries from 2006–2019; 51% of these firms had their annual financial statements checked and 
certified by external auditors. 11 Throughout our analysis, we control for country-level governance, 
institutional and macroeconomic variables. See Section 3.2 and Appendix 2 for a detailed 
explanation of the country-level variables.  
 
3.2. Variables and Summary Statistics 
We first describe our dependent variables.12 Our primary analyses focus on corruption 
obstacles (CorruptionObstacle). Firm-level corruption obstacles take on a value based on the self-
reported answers to the following WBES question: “How problematic is corruption for the current 
operations of the business?” The obstacles are measured on a scale from 0 to 4: no obstacles (0), 
minor obstacles (1), moderate obstacles (2), major obstacles (3), and very severe obstacles (4). As 
a robustness check, we replace CorruptionObstacle with a dummy variable, CorruptionDummy, 
in our baseline regressions. CorruptionDummy takes a value of 1 if the corruption obstacle scores 
equal 2 (moderate), 3 (major), or 4 (very severe), and 0 if the scores are 0 (no obstacle) or 1 (minor 
obstacle). 
We further use two additional firm-level obstacles as dependent variables: business 
licensing- and permits-related obstacles (LicenseObstacle) and customs-related obstacles 
(CustomsObstacle). These two obstacles are measured similarly as CorruptionObstacle on a scale 
from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating no obstacles and 4 indicating very severe obstacles. We consider 
these two obstacles to be alternative measures of corruption obstacles as they measure the 
difficulties arising from firms’ direct interactions with government bureaucrats.  
We also use two relatively more objective measures related to direct interactions with 
bureaucrats as our alternative dependent variables, specifically, “What % of senior management 
 
11 We acknowledge that there are quality variations of financial audits across our sample countries. This concern is 
mitigated by the fact that most of the countries in our sample have adopted the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). According to the IFRS, www.ifrs.org, IFRS standards are now required in more than 140 
jurisdictions and permitted in many others. More importantly, in 166 jurisdictions, IFRS for non-listed SMEs 
standards are required or permitted. In our Appendix 1, the “*” next to the country name indicates IFRS adoption. In 
our sample, 85% of the countries have adopted IFRS. In another mitigation strategy, we control for country-fixed 
effect in our regressions. 
12 Appendix 2 details the variables and their sources.  
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time was spent in dealing with government regulations?” (TimeonGovernment), and “Over the last 
12 months, was this establishment inspected by tax officials?” (TaxInspection). We argue that 
TimeonGovernment and CorruptionObstacle are two closely related variables. The higher the odds 
that the firm incurs corruption-related costs, the more time the senior management spends in 
dealing with government regulations. We also expect that TaxInspection and CorruptionObstacle 
are positively linked, as Alm et al. (2016) indicate that tax inspection is positively related to bribes.   
Panel A in Table 1 reports summary statistics for our full sample. On average, our sample 
firms experience close to moderate corruption obstacles (mean = 1.71), minor license obstacles 
(mean = 1.06), and minor customs obstacles (mean = 1.00). Senior management spends 10.73% 
of their time dealing with government regulations, and 58% of our sample firms were inspected 
by tax officials the previous year.   
Among the explanatory variables, our key variable, AFS, is an indicator variable that equals 
1 if a firm’s annual financial statements are checked and certified by an external auditor, and 0 
otherwise. As shown in Table 1, about 51% of the surveyed firms choose to have their financial 
statements audited.   
Ten firm-level characteristics are used as control variables in the regressions. The first is 
firm size. Large firms are linked to fewer business obstacles than small firms, while small firms 
benefit when growth obstacles are reduced (Schiffer and Weder, 2001; Beck et al., 2005; Cull and 
Xu, 2005; Knack and Xu, 2017). Moreover, firm size tends to be positively related with firm 
profitability in small to medium-sized enterprises (Papadogonas, T. A., 2007; Doğan, 2013; and 
Yazdanfar, 2013).13 Considering that firm profitability is not directly available from the WBES 
dataset, including firm size helps to control the effect of firm profitability. As shown in Panel A 
of Table 1, the mean and median employee numbers (FirmSize) in our sample are 98 and 20, 
respectively, which indicate the existence of extreme outliers regarding firm size. To alleviate the 
concern of extreme outliers, we take the logarithm of full-time employees as firm size 
(Ln_FirmSize). 
Because younger firms tend to grow faster than older firms (Dunne et al., 1988) and are 
more likely to be harassed to pay bribes due to a less-developed relationship with bureaucrats 
 
13 Becker-Blease et al. (2010) argue that there is a reverse U-shape size-profitability relationship in US manufacturing 
firms. Considering that 50%, 75% and 95% of firms surveyed by WBES have less than 20, 60 and 350 employees, 
respectively, few firms in our sample may have a firm size more than the optimal point.  
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(Fisman and Svensson, 2007), we control for firm age (FirmAge). In our sample, the average firm 
has been in business for about 18 years, and the oldest firm is 340 years old (Table 1, Panel A).14 
We take the natural logarithm of a firm’s age (Ln_FirmAge) to reduce the influence of outliers. 
We also control for the work experience of top managers. All things being equal, more-
experienced managers are likely to have more-developed business relationships. Furthermore, 
experienced managers are likely to know where and how to build connections with key 
government officials (Bac, 2001). Managerial experience (Experience) is measured as the number 
of years that the top manager has been working in the same sector. In our sample, the average 
Experience for the top manager is 17.5 years (Table 1, Panel A).     
We further control for ownership structure of the firm. State ownership is believed to be 
and is often shown in fact to be associated with more political interference. State ownership’s 
political motives (employment and social stability) usually trump profit motives, leading to corrupt 
dealings (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Beck et al., 2005). We measure government ownership in 
our analysis with a dummy variable, Government, that equals 1 if the government has a ownership 
stake in the firm, and 0 otherwise. In our sample, only 1% of all firms have at least partial 
government ownership.   
In developing countries, foreign-owned firms are more likely to be targeted for harassment 
by local bureaucrats because they have fewer useful connections than domestic firms. They are 
also more likely to be harassed in part because they tend to be more profitable (Estrin et al., 2009; 
Harrison et al., 2014). We control for firm’s foreign ownership with a dummy variable, Foreign, 
that equals 1 if any foreign companies or individuals have an ownership stake in the firm, and 0 
otherwise. About 8% of all firms in our sample have foreign ownership.  
 Another key variable we control for is competition. Competition increases the risk of 
forced exits from the market. This spurs effort by firms to stay in business, including building 
useful business and government connections. Firms facing more-intensive competition tend to 
experience greater financing obstacles and corruption (Beck et al., 2005). We thus include a 
dummy variable, Compete, that equals 1 if the firm answered “Yes” to the question: “Does this 
 
14 The oldest firm in our sample is a food-manufacturing firm in Jamaica.  
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establishment compete against unregistered or informal firms?”15 About 50% of our sample firms 
believe that they compete against informal firms (see Panel A of Table 1).  
            We also control for the firm’s exporting status and capital expenditures. Firms involved in 
exporting may be more vulnerable to rent extraction and subject to greater bureaucratic scrutiny 
and regulation than firms with only local sales (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Hence, we include a 
dummy variable denoting whether a firm directly exports (Exporter). We control for capital 
expenditures, CapitalExpenditure, because capital expenditures likely capture a firm’s growth 
opportunities. A high-growth firm is more likely to be the target of rent extraction, as high-growth 
firms have more interactions with bureaucrats regarding business licenses and permits and with 
state-controlled banks for credit. Panel A, Table 1, shows that 17% of our sample firms are 
exporters, and 44% have capital investment.   
 Finally, we control for firm legal category in the regressions. As noted earlier, listed firms 
and non-listed firms face very different market and regulatory pressures that shape their financial 
reporting decisions. Firms registered as limited liability companies also face different accounting 
and tax rules compared with firms registered as sole proprietorships and partnerships. In this study, 
firms that report their legal status as a “shareholding company with traded shares” are defined as 
public firms (Public). Firms that report their legal status as a “shareholding company with non-
traded shares” are defined as limited liability companies (Company). Firms whose legal status is 
reported as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited partnership, or other are defined as 
“NonCompany”. Public and Company are used as control variables in the regressions, while 
NonCompany is the default category. In our sample, 5% of the sample firms are  Public while 42% 
of the firms are Company, and 53% of the firms are NonCompany (see Panel A, Table 1).  
We now turn to measures of country-level control variables. Eight basic macro controls, 
which are GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, private credit, corruption control, 
government effectiveness and rule of law, are incorporated in all our regressions. First, we control 
for key macroeconomics indicators, including the GDP level, GDP per capita, the GDP growth 
rate, and inflation, as the basic macroeconomic environment influences firm policies and firms’ 
interactions with bureaucrats (as in Beck et al., 2005; Knack and Xu, 2017). Second, country-level 
 
15 Arguably this is not the best measure of competition since it does not capture competition from the formal sector. 
However, the informal sector accounts for a large share of the economy in developing countries (La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2014). Moreover, the WBES does not contain better measures. 
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financial development also plays important roles in determining how firm-level financial 
information is disseminated and used by various economic agents. As a control for country-level 
financial/credit market development, we use the ratio of domestic banking credit to the private 
sector over GDP (PrivateCredit). The mean of PrivateCredit is 38.8% (see Panel A, Table 1). 
Third, we include three measures from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
database to capture the country-level institutional development. These three measures are 
corruption control (CorruptionControl), government effectiveness (GovernmentEffectiveness), 
and the rule of law (RuleofLaw). All three variables range from −2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong) and 
vary widely across our sample countries (see Panel A of Table 1).  
Extended sets of macro controls, which are economic freedom, legal origins and culture, 
are included in our robustness tests. We expect that those controls would help us to further reduce 
the country-level omitted variable concern, especially the omitted country governance concern. 
Prior studies show that economic freedom, legal origins, and culture all have significant impacts 
on country-level corruption and governance (Husted, 1999; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Graeff and 
Mehlkop, 2003). We therefore include economic freedom measures (GovernmentIntegrity, 
FinancialFfreedom, and BusinessFreedom), country legal origins (English, Nordic, German, 
Socialist, and French), and culture measures (PowerDistance, Individualism, 
UncertaintyAvoidance, and Masculinity). As shown in Panel A of Table 1, these additional macro 
controls exhibit rich variations across our sample countries. 
We also control for country, industry, and year fixed effects in our multivariate regressions. 
The country dummy holds constant all country-specific factors such as geography, culture, and the 
basic legal system, which are time-invariant during our sample period. The industry and year 
dummies further hold constant all industry-specific heterogeneity and worldwide common shocks. 
These comprehensive controls are useful to address the omitted variable concerns.  
 
3.3. Univariate Tests    
We first present univariate test results for our key variables between firms with AFS (AFS 
firms) and without AFS (non-AFS firms) (see Panel B of Table 1). Relative to non-AFS firms, AFS 
firms face a significantly higher level of CorruptionObstacle, LicenseObstacle, and 
CustomsObstacle. Management in AFS firms also spends more time dealing with government 
regulations and those firms are more likely to be inspected by tax officials. AFS firms are generally 
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larger and older, and their top managers are more experienced. They are more likely to have foreign 
or government ownership, to export, and to invest in fixed assets, but less likely to compete with 
competitors in informal sectors. The legal status of AFS firms tends to be Public (listed) or 
Company (non-listed limited liability), instead of NonCompany (sole proprietorship or 
partnerships). In summary, our univariate tests show that AFS and non-AFS firms differ 
significantly in corruption obstacles and other firm characteristics, which will be controlled for in 
the regressions.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Before we get to the empirical results, it is important to bear in mind potential danger of 
over-interpreting the quantitative results for any policy debate. While the qualitative empirical 
results are informative on the direction of the underlying relationship, the specific quantitative 
magnitude might hinge on the underlying institutional and other contexts. Hence, strong caution 
is advised when considering our quantitative estimates in policy debates. 
 
4. AFS and Corruption Obstacles  
We now investigate the costs associated with the production of AFS regarding government 





We expect β1, the coefficient of AFS, to be positive and significant, as we hypothesize that the 
production and disclosure of AFS increases the potential of government expropriation.   
 The empirical results are presented in Table 3. Columns (1) and (3) report the OLS/LPM 
regression results and columns (2) and (4) report the Ordered Probit results. Country fixed effects 
are only included in columns (3) and (4), while country-level macro controls and industry and year 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficients of 
AFS, β1, are positive and significant at the conventional level in all four regressions. These results 
constitute our baseline finding that the production of AFS is linked to higher-level corruption 
obstacles faced by the firm. We note that once country fixed effects are included in the OLS 
CorruptionObstaclei,j = α + β1 AFSi,j + β2 Ln_FirmSizei,j + β3 Ln_FirmAgei,j + β4 Experiencei,j + β5Governmenti,j + 
 β6 Foreigni,j + β7 Exporteri,j + β8 Competei,j + β9  CapitalExpenditurei,j 
                     + β10  Publici,j + β11  Companyi,j + θ'  Country Controlsj + εij      (1) 
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regressions, the magnitude of the AFS coefficient becomes smaller. Specifically, when a firm shift 
its audting status from 0 to 1, its reported corruption obstacle may increase by 0.157 when country 
fixed effects are not included, which is a 9% (0.157/1.71) increase in its reported corruption 
obstacles considering that the average corruption obstacles in our sample is 1.71. When country 
fixed effects are included, a shift in audting status from 0 to 1 may increase a firm’s reported 
corruption obstacles by 0.046, a 3% (0.157/1.71) increase.  
How other firm characteristics affect corruption obstacles is also interesting. Perceived 
corruption obstacles are lower in firms with government ownership. Firms with government 
ownership probably have stronger political connections compared to firms without government 
ownership. It might be that managers in state-owned firms know “who to call” to get things done 
(Bac, 2001). Perceived corruption obstacles are higher for exporters, which not surprising given 
that exporting firms have to go through a lot bureaucratic red tape to obtain export licenses in 
developing countries, which increases their vulnerability to government expropriation (Murphy et 
al., 1993, Svensson, 2005). Perceived corruption obstacles are higher for firms that compete with 
informal businesses. Informal businesses are partially immune from government harassment 
because they avoid formal registration and become invisible to the government (Johnson et al., 
1998).  
As a robustness test, we replace CorruptionObstacle with CorruptionDummy in Equation 
(2) and rerun all the four regressions. AFS continues to be positively and significantly related to 
Corruption Dummy. 16 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5. Potential Endogeneity 
 Potential reverse causality in the AFS-CO relationship and omitted variables in our 
regression specifications may bias our baseline results reported in Table 2. As shown in Johnson 
et al. (1998), higher corruption drives more firms to go underground (becoming part of the informal 
economy). Durnev et al. (2009) and Durnev and Fauver (2011) further show that high government 
expropriation risk leads to low transparency. This reverse causality would yield an underestimated 
AFS effect: the real AFS effect on firm-level corruption obstacles is more pronounced than the 
OLS estimate. Hence, the reverse causality documented in the above studies should strengthen our 
 
16 For brevity, we report the results in Internet Appendix Table IA1. 
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confidence in the OLS findings. We also recognize the issue of omitted variables. As previously 
discussed in Section 3.2, ten firm-level controls (including AFS), eight country-level controls, and 
country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in our regressions. We realize that these 
controls help alleviate some concerns about omitted variables, but the concerns remain, 
nevertheless.  
 To establish a causal effect that AFS leads to more firm-level corruption obstacles, we need 
to show the counterfactual that, had the firm not produced and disclosed audited financial 
statements, it would have been subject to less harassment by bureaucrats. However, the WBES 
data for financial reporting practices are not randomly assigned among firms. In the absence of a 
random assignment, one can identify the causal effects by relying on one of the three common 
empirical strategies—IV techniques, panel datasets, or natural experiments (such as policy shocks) 
that produce exogenous variations. We discuss our regression results using the above three 
strategies in Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively. Furthermore, as a qualitative robustness check, 
in Section 5.4, we conduct a semi-structured survey of business owners to gauge their experiences 
and thoughts concerning financial disclosure on corruption obstacles in practice.   
 
5.1. IV Analysis 
 We use the country-industry-year average probability of AFS (AFS_CIY) as an IV for AFS. 
AFS_CIY, which reflects that the financial transparency environment a firm faces should 
positively affect a firm’s external auditing decision but should not directly affect a firm’s perceived 
corruption obstacles. Similar firms controls as specified in Eq (1), industry and year fixed effects 
are included in our two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Results with various country level 
controls are reported in different columns in Table 3. 
 First, we include the same set of macro controls in our regressions as we do in Table 2, and 
report the results in Table 3, Columns (1) and (5). In the first stage (Column 1), AFS_CIY is 
positively and significantly related with AFS. In the second stage (Column 5), the predicted AFS 
is positively and significantly related with CO.  
 Second, we extend our macro controls to alleviate the concern that country-level omitted 
variables, especially omitted country governance or institution variables, may bias our OLS 
estimation. We therefore include economic freedom measures (GovernmentIntegrity, 
FinancialFreedom, and BusinessFreedom) and country legal origins (English, Nordic, German, 
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Socialist, and French) in the 2SLS, and report the results in Table 3, Columns (2) and (6). 
Additional culture measures (PowerDistance, Individualism, UncertaintyAvoidance and 
Masculinity) are included the 2SLS regressions with results reported in Columns (3) and (7). Due 
to data unavailability, including culture measures reduces the number of observations by 
approximately 1/3. After including this extensive set of macro level variables, AFS_CIY continues 
to be positively and significantly related with AFS (Columns 2 and 3), and the predicted AFS 
continues to be positively and significantly related with CO (Columns 6 and 7).  
 Third, we add country fixed effects in addition to basic macro variables in the 2SLS 
regressions with results reported in Table 3, Columns (4) and (8). The 1st stage result remains 
positive and significant, while the 2nd stage result is still positive but statistically insignificant at 
the 10% level (t-statistic=1.45). We acknowledge that the instrumental variable we use, AFS_CIY, 
which is calculated as the country-industry-year average probability of AFS, has limited variation 
when country, industry and year fixed effects are all included in the regressions. We also note that 
once country fixed effects are included in the 2SLS regressions, the magnitude of the coefficient 
becomes smaller, a pattern similar to the results in Table 2.  
 In sum, Table 3 shows that our results are robust with the inclusion of an extensive list of 
country-level governance and institution variables, which helps to alleviate the concern that 
omitted country governance factors may drive our results. We note that the main purpose of the 
2SLS analysis is to provide supporting evidence for the results of the OLS analysis, (in particular, 
the sign of the coefficients of interest rather than its quantitative value), and we suggest the readers 
to interpret the magnitude of these IV estimates with caution.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2. Panel Analysis 
 The World Bank surveyed most of the countries a few times in different years, so within 
each country, some firms are surveyed twice. We use the idenifier provided by the  World Bank  
to find these firms and form a panel dataset. With the panel data, we can control for firm fixed 
effects, hence separating the impacts of the firm-level time-invariant omitted variables.   
 Table 4 reports the panel regression results. Firm fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. Industry fixed effects are only included in Columns (3) and (4) since the majority of  
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firms do not switch their industry between the two surveys, and controlling for firm fixed effects 
renders industry fixed effects unimportant. Columns (1) and (3) report the whole panel dataset 
results, while Columns (2) and (4) report the subsample results for firms that changed AFS status. 
Again, we find that AFS is positively and significantly related to corruption obstacles in all 
regressions.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3. Regression Discontinuity Design Analysis 
 We perform a regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis using the mandatory auditing 
requirements issued by certain countries.17 For this analysis, we collected data for 41 countries that 
use the number of employees as one of the mandatory auditing thresholds (see Internet Appendix 
Table IA3). Two examples are presented below: 18  
Greece: Greece’s accounting Law 4449/2017 stipulates that “Under the law, all public 
interest entities and all companies that meet two of the following criteria for two 
consecutive years are subject to mandatory statutory audits: (i) total assets of EU 4,000,000; 
(ii) net turnover of EU 8,000,000; and (iii) average employees of 50 for the year.” 
  
Hungary: “Companies surpassing both of the following thresholds must undergo a 
statutory audit: (i) the annual net sales (calculated for the period of one year) exceed 
Hungarian forint (HUF) 300 million on the average of the two financial years preceding 
the financial year under review and (ii) the average number of people employed by the 
undertaking exceed 50 people on the average of the two financial years preceding the 
financial year under review.” 
 The laws indicate that a firm may trigger the mandatory auditing requirement if its assets, 
revenue, or number of employees exceed certain thresholds. We hand-collect the country-level 
data of mandatory auditing requirements by searching all countries surveyed by the World Bank 
regarding their accounting and auditing laws. Since assets are not available in the WBES, revenues 
 
17 A partial list of recent studies using this technique to examine various corporate decisions includes Cunat et al. 
(2012, 2020), Boone and White (2015), Becht et al. (2016), Malenko and Shen (2016), Focke et al.  (2017), and Li et 
al. (2018). 
18 For more details, see https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/country/greece.  
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reported by each firm are often rounded to the nearest thousands or millions; only the  number of 
employees is reported relatively precisely in the WBES (Cheng et al., 2020). We hence choose the 
employee thresholds required by each country as the cutoff points used in our RDD analysis. The 
discrete nature of the threshold provides us an opportunity to investigate firms with employees 
right above or below the threshold.19   
 However, the requirement of triggering multiple threholds limits our ability to precisely 
estimate which firms should be audited because of the dataset coverage. We argue that a higher-
than-threshold employee number only increases the probability that the firm needs to be audited 
when the asset measure is unavailable and the revenue measure is imprecise. Moreover, the 
majority of the countries in our sample are developing economies with weak institutions. Firms 
who satify all auditing requirements may still choose not to reveal its financial statements if the 
countries’ accounting/auditing law is not properly enforced.  
 Another limitation we face is the percent of firms that are required by law to be audited. 
Only 23% of firms are in countries with a clearly specified employee related auditing requirement. 
Within these countries, 21% of the firms have employees above the threshold, representing about 
only 5% of our full sample. We find that, 72% of these above-employee-threshold firms are 
audited, indicating that either some firms do not meet two or more auditing thresholds, or some 
firms simply choose not to be audited if non-compliance is not associated with a substantial 
punishment. On the other side, 41% of these below-employee-threshold firms are audited. 
Therefore, for a super majority of firms in our sample, firms still choose whether to produce 
audited financial statements. 
 The key assumption of a valid RDD for causal interpretation is that agents cannot precisely 
manipulate the running variable, which is the number of employees in our setting. We conjecture 
that if firms perceive producing audited financial statements is associated with higher corruption 
obstacles, they may try to stay right below the mandatory disclosure threshold to avoid having 
their financial statements audited. To formally test whether firms manipulate number of employees 
around the threshold, we test the null hypothesis of no discontinuity at the number of employees 
around the auditing threshold (McCrary, 2008). The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no 
discontinuity regardless of alternative bandwidths and the order of the local-polynomial. We plot 
the density function in Figure 1 and report the manipulation test results in Table 5. The x-axis 
 
19 As shown in Table IA2, the thresholds range from 10 employees in Tunisia to 1,000 in Sri Lanka. 
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measure used in Figure 1, Distance, equals the number of employees minus the threshold. Visual 
inspection of Figure 1 reveals clear evidence of firms trying to avoid triggering the disclosure 
threshold: there is a distinct discontinuity of the density function at the number of employee 
threshold due to a cluster of firms stay right below the threshold.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  
 Since we find strong evidence that firms do manipulate the number of employees, we are 
not able to draw a definite conclusion regarding causality because firms are not randomly 
distributed around the threshold. We nevertheless proceed to test whether the perceived corruption 
obstacles are different around the threshold. Figure 2 plots local sample means (i.e., the dots in the 
graph) of corruption obstacles using nonoverlapping evenly spaced bins on each side of the number 
of employees threshhold. The solid lines are based on local linear regression model (Panel A) and 
smoothed quadratic polynomial model (Panel B) estimated separately on the two sides of the 
threshold. The plot shows a discontinuous jump in corruption obstacle right at the threshold: firms 
with number of employees right above (below) the auditing threshold have higher (lower) 
corruption obstacles. We further report the regression discontinuity (RD) estimates (with and 
without controls) for alternative bandwidths in Appendix 3. Consistent with Figure 2, we find that 
overall, RD estimates are positive, although some of them are not statistically significant, 
depending on the bandwidth used and whether the confidence intervals are bias-corrected 
(Calonico et al., 2014). 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Overall, although we are not able to draw causal inference based on our RD estimates 
because it appears that firms are not randomly distributed around the auditing threshold of the 
number of employees, we think this analysis provides us interesting supporting evidence that 
suggests firms perceive that it is costly to reveal their financial information by producing audited 
financial statements.  
 
5.4. Evidence from a Survey of Entrepreneurs 
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In the previous sections, we document a positive relationship between AFS and CO. We 
also provide some evidence of causality in the relation. To directly understand how financial 
disclosure affects corruption obstacles, we conducted a semi-structured survey of entrepreneurs in 
developing countries. The survey was qualitative in nature, as opposed to more structured ones 
that produce data for empirical analysis. The goal is to gain insights directly from entrepreneurs 
concerning the relation between financial disclosure and corruption. In other words, we want to 
know whether our empirical findings are qualitatively consistent with what happens “on the 
ground.”   
We prepared three open-ended questions (See Table 6, Panel A) to elicit thoughts and 
experiences from business insiders concerning whether their firms are negatively affected by 
corruption (Q1), whether and how financial disclosure is linked to corruption (Q2 and Q2a), and 
whether their firms take any specific measures to control financial disclosure to limit corruption-
related costs (Q3). Q2 and Q2a were designed to qualitatively address our main hypothesis that 
more financial disclosure leads to higher corruption-related costs for the firm. Q3 was designed to 
provide a qualitative robustness check, that is, if more disclosure leads to more corruption 
obstacles, then entrepreneurs would take measures to control information disclosure. We carried 
out two surveys: one involved face-to-face interviews of business executives at an international 
tradeshow in Las Vegas, and the other involved written surveys of business owners in China.  
 
5.4.1. Interviews at the SupplySide West Trade Show  
SupplySide West is an annual trade show held at the Mandalay Bay Hotel in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. The 2017 exhibition, held September 26–30, 2017, provided us with a suitable setting to 
conduct face-to-face interviews of entrepreneurs. Over 1,000 exhibitors and 15,000 participants 
from 30 countries attended the 2017 exhibition. One co-author and three Ph.D. students attended 
the trade show from September 28 to September 30. Our strategy was to seek exhibitors from 
developing countries, wait for a quiet time when no other attendees were actively engaging the 
exhibitors, and then approach the person operating the exhibition booth. We first identified 
ourselves (“We are researchers from the xxx university”) and inquired about the person’s position 
in the company. If the person self-identified as a senior position holder (owner, general manager, 
or senior VP), then we conveyed the purpose of our survey (“We are doing a research project and 
would greatly appreciate if we can have 15-20 minutes of your time to ask a few questions”). We 
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assured anonymity (“The identities of you and your firm will not appear in our notes nor our 
research report”). If the person identified himself or herself as an assistant, a secretary, or “just a 
marketing person,” then we thanked him or her and moved on to the next booth. 
In total, we were able to initiate 51 interviews at the trade show over two days, with 41 
executives from China, five from India, three from Mexico, one from Argentina, and one from 
Taiwan. However, among the 51 interviews, only nine produced useful responses (Table 6, Panel 
B1). The useful ones are those in which all the questions were answered with genuine effort.  
 
5.4.2. Survey of Entrepreneurs              
Due to the limited success of our face-to-face interviews at the trade show, we carried out 
a targeted written survey of business owners in China. Instead of “cold calls,” which would 
possibly yield even worse outcomes than our face-to-face interviews, we surveyed business owners 
personally known by at least of one of the co-authors. We also asked each of our business owner 
friends to distribute the survey to a few of his or her entrepreneur friends. We emphasized 
anonymity, and also stressed that their actual experiences and true thoughts on the corruption-
related questionnaires would be the most helpful. After distributing the surveys, we waited for two 
weeks then followed up with emails and phone calls. At the end of one month, 17 surveys were 
returned. Among the returned surveys, nine are considered useful in that all questions were 
answered with genuine effort (Table 6, Panel B2). Between the face-to-face interviews and the 
written surveys, we obtained 18 useful surveys.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.4.3. Survey Results  
As mentioned earlier, the interviews and surveys were not meant to produce data for 
statistical analysis. Instead, we aim to provide direct evidence by asking business owners their true 
thoughts on how financial disclosure affects corruption obstacles their firms face. Out of 18 useful 
surveys, 13 business owners (72%) confirmed that their businesses have been negatively affected 
by corruption (Q1).  
Regarding Q2, that is, whether more financial disclosure leads to higher chances of 
corruption obstacles in their firms, in 11 out of the 18 useful surveys (61%), entrepreneurs 
responded that the production of their companies’ financial information increases corruption 
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obstacles. The majority of the entrepreneurs surveyed (10 out of 18, or 56%) indicated that their 
firms take measures to restrict financial information disclosure to minimize corruption-related 
costs (Q3). 
In summary, the results from the surveys and interviews provide qualitative support for our 
main finding, that is, what we document in the paper is qualitatively consistent with what happens 
“on the ground.” Explicitly, the majority of the entrepreneurs surveyed confirm there is a link 
between financial disclosure and corruption obstacles their firms face. The majority of them further 
state that more financial disclosure could lead to “more troubles” for the firms.  
Taking together, the results from these endogeneity strategies reported in Tables 3, 4, and 
5 provide support for our baseline results and suggest that the production and disclosure of detailed 
and credible financial information leads to a higher level of harassment by rent-seeking bureaucrats 
in private firms across a large number of developing economies.  
 
6. Specific Measures of Corruption Obstacles 
 In our baseline analysis, we use CorruptionObstacle as an aggregate measure of perceived 
corruption obstacles faced by the firm. As robustness checks, we employ several specific measures 
of obstacles arising from firms’ direct interactions with government officials. If AFS leads to more 
exposure to government expropriation, we are likely to observe an increase in harassment in places 
where firms’ interactions with bureaucrats take place, and sometimes those interactions are 
unavoidable. We hence examine obstacles encountered by firms when applying for business 
licenses and permits (LicenseObstacle) or when dealing with customs and trade regulations 
(CustomsObstacle).20  
 We also argue that disclosing more financial information would entice bureaucrats from 
various government agencies to use their authority to extract bribes. Specifically, tax inspectors in 
developing countries may consider tax inspections as good opportunities to solicit bribes (Alm et 
al., 2016). Hence, we conjecture that AFS will cause senior management to spend more time  
dealing with government regulations (TimeonGovernment) and increase the odds of being 
inspected by tax officials (TaxInspection), thereby providing more rent-seeking opportunities.   
 
20 Svensson (2005) once interviewed a successful Thai CEO and the topic was corruption in the foreign trade sector. 
The CEO exclaimed, “I hope to be reborn as a customs official.” Svensson (2005) could only conclude that 
corruption at customs is severe.      
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As shown in Table 7, the coefficient of AFS is positive and significant across all four 
models, with or without country fixed effects. These results lend further support to our thesis in 
that they point to specific channels through which corrupt bureaucrats could use the disclosed 
financial information to increase their rent-seeking opportunities.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
7. The Role of Institutional Development  
 So far, we have assumed that AFS has a homogeneous effect on corruption obstacles across 
countries. But this effect likely hinges on the underlying institutions (Stulz, 2005; Durnev and 
Guriev, 2011). A large volume of literature has documented a direct positive relationship between 
a country’s institutional development and economic growth at the country level as well as at the 
firm level (Knack and Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Beck et al., 2005, Beck et al., 2006, 
Doidge et al., 2007, Harrison et al., 2014, among others). Since developing countries are 
characterized by low-quality institutions, a high level of public corruption, and low contracting 
efficiency, firms wary of government expropriation, unenforceable contracts, or unfair 
competitions will adopt less-than-optimal financial reporting practices. Therefore, we conjecture 
that a country’s institution quality plays an important role in the relation between AFS and the 
degree of harassment by bureaucrats at the firm-level.  
To measure country-level institutional quality, we employ three measures from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (CorruptionControl, GovernmentEffectiveness, and RuleofLaw). These 
measures are estimates of a country’s overall institutional ability to control public corruption. 
Higher values indicate better institutional quality and less government expropriation (see 
Appendix 2 for descriptions of these indices). As shown in Panel A of Table 1, these indices vary 
widely across our sample countries.  
  We now examine how the effect of AFS on corruption obstacles depends on the national 
level of institutional developments. We add to Equation (1) three interactions, 
AFS*CorruptionControl, AFS* GovernmentEffectiveness, or AFS*RuleofLaw, and re-estimate the 
equation with OLS regressions in Table 8.  
The coefficients of all three interaction terms are negative and significant. Thus, a country’s 
corruption control, government effectiveness, and rule of law all play an important role in 
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moderating the AFS-CO relation. In other words, when a country’s governance improves, the cost 
of government expropriation associated with AFS decreases. These results suggest that enhancing 
the country-level institutional quality can effectively constrain bureaucrats’ rent-seeking and 
encourage firms’ information disclosure.    
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
8. Conclusions 
Using WBES data for about 150,000 firms in 143 developing countries from 2006–2019, 
we study financial reporting practices and their consequences. We focus on potential costs 
associated with AFS and document that AFS firms are associated with higher levels of corruption 
obstacles than non-AFS firms. Our results hold after various endogeneity tests and robustness checks. 
We further document that country-level institutional development has an important impact on the 
AFS-CO relationship.  
Our study contributes to the literature by providing novel empirical evidence that AFS is 
linked to higher corruption obstacles at the firm level. This finding demonstrates that increased 
financial transparency bears important costs in exposing the firm to government expropriation, as 
a rent-seeking bureaucrat utilizes the disclosed financials to maximize the level of harassment 
(Bliss and Tella, 1997; Svensson, 2003; and Fisman and Svensson, 2007). The dark side of 
exposing firms to government expropriation is rarely explored empirically in the literature (Leuz 
and Wysocki, 2008), and our study usefully fills this literature gap. Our empirical findings are also 
supported by the survey and interview responses we obtained from entrepreneurs who operate 
businesses in developing countries.  
Our paper also contributes by finding that country-level institution quality plays an 
essential role in the relationship between financial reporting practices and firm-level business 
obstacles faced by private firms in developing countries. This finding nicely illustrates the 
complementary relationship between financial disclosure and institutional background, which is 
also underexplored in the literature but emphasized by Leuz and Wysocki (2008) in their survey. 
Our paper illustrates that increased firm financial transparency via the production of detailed 
and credible financial information, is related to the increased risk of government expropriation. As 
firm financial information becomes more readily available, government expropriations (i.e., 
corruption obstacles) become more severe, especially in countries with poor institutional quality. The 
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results thus support Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) on the overwhelming importance of constraining 
government expropriation.  
Finally, our results have policy implications. Specifically, as shown in Table IA3, more 
developing countries have started to adopt rules that require firms to audit financial statements under 
the implicit assumption that in general, information disclosure benefits firms. However, our findings 
that show a potential dark side of producing audited financial statements and imply that not all these 
country-level mandatory disclosure requirements unambiguously benefit firms, especially if the 
country has weak institution quality. Indeed, our evidence of firms choosing not to trigger the audit 
requirement by limiting the number of their employees suggests that firms are willing to forgo some 
growth opportunities to avoid potential costs associated with producing audited financial statements.   
Our paper represents a step forward in understanding private firms’ financial disclosure 
decisions and their consequences in developing countries. As more data becomes available, especially 
firm-level panel data on investment returns and change of ownership/investor types, scholars can help 
advance this understanding in future research in two important areas. First, given that the literature 
provides mixed evidence on how corruption affects returns to investment and investment efficiency 
(e.g., Campos et al., 1999; Cumming et al., 2010; O’Toole and Tarp, 2014; Zheng and Xiao, 2020), 
it would be helpful to examine the impact of the disclosure-induced cost of corruption on firm growth 
and investment efficiency, as this empirical evidence will help answer questions concerning the net 
impact of information transparency when firms operate in corrupting environment. Another 
interesting question would be that when governance fails at the country level, are there alternative 
governance mechanisms that can alleviate the negative impact? Existing literature suggests that 
active private equity fund managers that bring about organizational change in their investees can 
alleviate the expected costs of corruption (e.g., Cressy et al., 2007; Cumming, 2008; Cumming et 
al., 2010). Future research may investigate whether and how active institutional investors affect 
the costs and benefits of information disclosure in countries with different levels of corruption.   
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Figure 1. McCray Density Plot  
 
Panels A and B depict the regression discontinuity (RD) density on the left and right sides of the cutoff point, 
using the local linear regression model and the quadratic polynomial model, respectively. P indicates that the 
density estimators are constructed using the pth order of the local-polynomial. H indicates that the density 
estimators are constructed with the bandwidth (h) on the left and right sides of the cutoff point. Distance equals 
the number of employees minus the threshold. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that Distance has no 
density discontinuity around the cutoff point. If firms do not manipulate their number of employees around the 
auditing threshold, the distribution of Distance should be smooth around the threshold.  
Panel A: Local linear regression model 
 
Panel B: Quadratic polynomial model 
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Figure 2. Corruption Obstacles around the Auditing Threshold 
 
Figures A and B depict the corruption obstacles below and above the mandatory auditing threshold, using the 
local linear regression model and the quadratic polynomial model, respectively. Distance equals the number of 
employees minus the auditing threshold. 
 
Panel A: Local linear regression model 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
 
This table reports the summary statistics of our sample. Panel A presents the summary statistics of all variables 
used in our study. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Appendix 2. Panel B reports the summary 
statistics for audited and unaudited firms in the subsamples. The column “T-test” reports the two-tail t-statistics 
of two-sample t-tests comparing the means of audited and unaudited firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significances at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the full sample 
  N Mean Median  SD  Min Max 
Firm level variables       
AFS 148,199 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
CorruptionObstacle 145,301 1.71 2 1.49 0 4 
CorruptionDummy 145,301 0.52 1 0.50 0 1 
LicenseObstacle 145,553 1.06 1 1.20 0 4 
CustomsObstacle 136,994 1.00 0 1.22 0 4 
TimeonGovernment 139,453 10.73 3 19 0 100 
TaxCheckDummy 149,307 0.58 1 0 0 1 
FirmSize 150,162 97.89 20 468.67 1 64,000 
FirmAge 148,909 18.35 14 15.95 1 340 
Experience 147,009 17.50 15 11.18 0 75 
Government 148,728 0.01 0 0.07 0 1 
Foreign 148,675 0.08 0 0.25 0 1 
Compete 129,918 0.50 1 0.50 0 1 
Exporter 149,171 0.17 0 0.38 0 1 
CapitalExpenditure 149,578 0.44 0 0.50 0 1 
Public 149,842 0.05 0 0.22 0 1 
Company 149,842 0.42 0 0.49 0 1 









  N Mean Median  SD  Min Max 
Country level variables       
Ln_GDP 150,953 25.27 25.23 1.99 19.48 29.53 
Ln_GDPperCapita 150,953 8.07 8.04 1.08 5.40 10.89 
GDPGrowth 150,953 4.44 4.79 3.70 -25.91 19.68 
Inflation 142,256 7.19 6.58 5.89 -2.41 59.22 
PrivateCredit 146,792 38.84 31.15 40.55 1.09 972.21 
CorruptionControl 151,219 -0.48 -0.52 0.62 -1.59 2.29 
GovernmentEffectiveness 151,219 -0.32 -0.34 0.61 -1.69 1.91 
RuleofLaw 151,219 -0.45 -0.47 0.61 -1.83 1.97 
GovernmentIntegrity 144,742 32.17 31 11.59 10 93 
FinancialFreedom 143,670 46.77 50 15.95 10 80 
BusinessFreedom 144,742 59.93 61 13.06 20 93 
LegalEnglish 145,197 0.30 0 0.46 0 1 
LegalFrench 145,197 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 
LegalNordic 145,197 0.00 0 0.06 0 1 
LegalGerman 145,197 0.09 0 0.28 0 1 
LegalSocial 145,197 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 
PowerDistance 100,482 72.97 77 13.67 13 104 
Individualism 100,482 29.35 30 15.44 2 80 
UncertaintyAvoidance 100,482 64.80 67 20.04 13 101 
Masculinity 100,482 49.12 46 11.98 5 110 
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Panel B: Summary statistics for AFS vs. non-AFS firms 
 AFS firms Non-AFS firms  T-test 
 N Mean (1) N Mean (2)  Difference (1)-(2)   
        
CorruptionObstacle 72,670 1.78 69970 1.64  0.14***  
CorruptionDummy 72,670 0.54 69970 0.50  0.04***  
LicenseObstacle 72,943 1.10 69945 1.03  0.07***  
CustomsObstacle 69,325 1.10 65107 0.89  0.21***  
TimeonGovernment 69,829 11.40 67504 10.03  1.37***  
TaxInspection 74,265 0.66 72614 0.50  0.17***  
FirmSize 74,605 148.28 72715 46.00  102.28***  
FirmAge 74,022 20.95 72182 15.75  5.20***  
Experience 73,113 18.42 71325 16.65  1.77***  
Government 73,792 0.01 72104 0.00  0.01***  
Foreign 73,765 0.11 72086 0.05  0.07***  
Compete 65,595 0.49 61912 0.52  -0.03***  
Exporter 74,208 0.23 72205 0.11  0.12***  
CapitalExpenditure 74,308 0.50 72728 0.38  0.13***  
Public 74,544 0.07 72350 0.03  0.04***  
Company 74,544 0.44 72350 0.40  0.04***  
NonCompany 74,544 0.49 72350 0.57  -0.08***  
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Table 2: AFS and Firm Corruption Obstacle 
 
This table reports the impact of AFS on firms’ corruption obstacles. The OLS regression results are reported in 
columns (1) and (3), while Ordered Probit regression results are reported in columns (2) and (4). Macro controls, 
industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Country fixed effects are included in columns (3) 
and (4). Standard errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and 
sources are given in Appendix 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dep. Var. Corruption Obstacle 
 OLS/LPM Ordered Probit OLS/LPM Ordered Probit 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
AFS 0.1570*** 0.1202***  0.0464*** 0.0417*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0380)  (0.0168) (0.0144) 
Ln_FirmSize -0.0187* -0.0132*  -0.0047 -0.0029 
 (0.0095) (0.0077)  (0.0076) (0.0066) 
Ln_FirmAge 0.0330* 0.0263*  0.0133 0.0114 
 (0.0198) (0.0157)  (0.0110) (0.0094) 
Experience 0.0027** 0.0019*  0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.0012) (0.0010)  (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Government -0.6244*** -0.5632***  -0.2701** -0.2908*** 
 (0.1460) (0.1343)  (0.1134) (0.1047) 
Foreign -0.0409 -0.0333  -0.01 -0.0061 
 (0.0385) (0.0308)  (0.0294) (0.0251) 
Exporter 0.0643** 0.0513**  0.0507*** 0.0438*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0202)  (0.0180) (0.0141) 
Compete 0.3162*** 0.2465***  0.2893*** 0.2417*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0326)  (0.0284) (0.0238) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.0727** 0.0597**  0.0764** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0273)  (0.0306) (0.0242) 
Public -0.0451 -0.0353  -0.0826** -0.0676**  
 (0.0613) (0.0498)  (0.0381) (0.0309) 
Company 0.026 0.0202  0.003 -0.0024 
 (0.0536) (0.0445)  (0.0276) (0.0237) 
      
Macro Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No No  Yes Yes 
      
N 102,016 102,016 102,016 102,016 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.13 0.05  0.22 0.08 
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Table 3: AFS and Firm Corruption Obstacles: IV Analysis 
 
This table reports the IV analysis results. Exclusion restrictions are AFS_CIY (the country-industry-year average probability of AFS) and 
AFS_Required (1 if a firm’s permanent employee number is higher than the auditing threshold, 0 otherwise). To save space, only the coefficients of 
AFS and the IV are reported in Table 4. All other firm controls, macro controls, and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Standard errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Appendix 2. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  1st Stage   2nd Stage 
Dep. Var. AFS  Corruption Obstacle 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
AFS      0.5564*** 0.6211*** 0.6584*** 0.1313 
      (0.1903) (0.1967) (0.1951) (0.0908) 
AFS_CIY 0.9076*** 0.8982*** 0.8776*** 0.8141***      
 (0.0137) (0.0165) (0.0203) (0.0175)      
          







































          
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
          
N 102,016 95,630 66,645 102,016  102,016 95,630 66,645 102,016 
R2                     0.07 0.08 0.09 0.02 
1st Stage F_Test 4391 2953 1860 2156      
1st Stage F_Test_P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
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Table 4: AFS and Firm Corruption Obstacles: Panel Analysis 
 
This table reports the panel analysis results. Columns (1) and (3) report the whole panel dataset results, while 
columns (2) and (4) report the subsample results for firms with changed AFS status. Macro controls and firm and 
year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Industry fixed effects are included in columns (3) and (4). 
Standard errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are 
given in Appendix 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 













 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
      
AFS 0.0959* 0.1099**  0.0979* 0.1135**  
 (0.0521) (0.0516)  (0.0561) (0.0567) 
Ln_FirmSize -0.007 -0.0552  -0.0083 -0.0704 
 (0.0329) (0.0492)  (0.0344) (0.0479) 
Ln_FirmAge -0.0065 -0.0094  -0.0075 -0.0035 
 (0.0443) (0.0728)  (0.0472) (0.0777) 
Experience -0.0011 -0.0024  -0.0015 -0.002 
 (0.0020) (0.0036)  (0.0020) (0.0037) 
Government -0.6003 -0.723  -0.6464 -0.5969 
 (0.3802) (0.7034)  (0.4265) (0.7201) 
Foreign 0.1761** -0.0527  0.1624* -0.0756 
 (0.0855) (0.1614)  (0.0894) (0.1769) 
Exporter 0.0573 0.0709  0.0865 0.131 
 (0.0630) (0.1379)  (0.0644) (0.1562) 
Compete 0.2825*** 0.2400**  0.3003*** 0.2423**  
 (0.0518) (0.0931)  (0.0540) (0.0950) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.0867** 0.096  0.0864** 0.1075 
 (0.0372) (0.0673)  (0.0395) (0.0657) 
Public -0.0013 -0.1604  -0.0047 -0.1713 
 (0.1005) (0.1279)  (0.1027) (0.1333) 
Company -0.0135 -0.0447  -0.04 -0.0806 
 (0.0733) (0.1124)  (0.0724) (0.1169) 
      
Macro Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
N 14,678 4,382  13,598 4,030 
R2 0.63 0.61  0.63 0.61 
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Table 5: Regression Discontinuity Manipulation Test 
 
This table reports the regression discontinuity manipulation test results using local polynomial density 
estimation. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that the running variable has no density discontinuity around 
the cutoff point. We employ varied parameters P and H within the test. P indicates that the density estimators are 
constructed using the pth order of the local-polynomial. H indicates that the density estimators are constructed 
with the bandwidth (h) on the left and right sides of the cutoff point. 
 
P Bandwidth T-stat p-value 
P=1 H=+/-2 . . 
P=1 H=+/-4 -9.33 0.00 
P=1 H=+/-6 -7.55 0.00 
P=1 H=+/-8 -7.32 0.00 
P=2 H=+/-2 . . 
P=2 H=+/-4 -8.76 0.00 
P=2 H=+/-6 -7.44 0.00 
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Table 6: Semi-Structured Surveys 
 
This table reports the questions used in our interviews and surveys (Panel A) and survey statistics (Panel B).  
 
Panel A: Survey questions 
1. (Q1) Do you feel that your firm was or has been negatively affected by corruption in your country?  
(Q1a) If yes, can you describe a specific situation that happened in your firm or another firm with which 
you are familiar, in the past concerning corruption? 
2. (Q2) Do you think disclosing financial information will cause “troubles” to your firm? Please elaborate.  
(Q2a) Do you believe that more financial disclosure attracts more “demand for bribes” from bureaucrats? 
Please elaborate. 
3. (Q3) To limit the cost of “getting things done,” do you take any specific measures to restrict information 
disclosure? If yes, what are those measures? 
 
 
Panel B1: Interviews at SupplySide West Trade Show in Las Vegas, Sept. 28–30, 2017 
Country/region No. of firms 
interviewed 
No. of firms that did not want to provide detailed 
information 
No. of useful 
surveys 
China 41 40 1 
India 5 1 4 
Mexico 3 1 2 
Argentina 1 0 1 
Taiwan 1 0 1 
Total 51 42 9 
 
 
Panel B2: Written Surveys 
Country No. of surveys 
returned 
No. of firms that did not 
want to provide detailed 
information 
No. of useful surveys 
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Table 7: AFS and Firm Corruption Obstacles: Specific Measures of Corruption  
 
This table reports the impacts of AFS on firm-specific obstacles by License Obstacle, Customs Obstacle, Time Spent on Government, and Tax 
Inspection. Macro controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Country fixed effects are included in columns (5) to 
(8). Standard errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Appendix 2. ***, **, and 





















 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
AFS 0.0683* 0.0851** 0.9224* 0.1581***  0.0369* 0.0832*** 1.4130*** 0.1725*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0346) (0.5493) (0.0233)  (0.0187) (0.0243) (0.3168) (0.0216) 
Ln_FirmSize 0.0094 0.0481*** 0.0915 0.0288***  0.0222*** 0.0579*** 0.3357*** 0.0307*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0984) (0.0067)  (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0932) (0.0060) 
Ln_FirmAge -0.0119 0.0186 0.1085 0.0016  -0.0235** 0.0103 0.0947 0.0086 
 (0.0177) (0.0155) (0.2026) (0.0058)  (0.0095) (0.0087) (0.1258) (0.0052) 
Experience -0.0022** -0.0021 0.0323* 0.0001  -0.0027*** -0.0017* 0.0195* 0 
 (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0169) (0.0004)  (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0117) (0.0002) 
Government -0.3497*** -0.3484*** 0.8155 -0.1260*    -0.1838** -0.2012** 1.2455 -0.127 
 (0.1000) (0.1100) (1.6602) (0.0706)  (0.0731) (0.0897) (1.1016) (0.0878) 
Foreign 0.0493* 0.1971*** 0.1646 -0.0152  0.0076 0.1767*** -0.3542 -0.0162 
 (0.0283) (0.0328) (0.4741) (0.0120)  (0.0220) (0.0282) (0.2867) (0.0113) 
Exporter 0.0501** 0.3284*** 1.1353** 0.0055  0.0585*** 0.3314*** 0.7392* 0.0035 
 (0.0228) (0.0271) (0.4847) (0.0109)  (0.0163) (0.0257) (0.4289) (0.0093) 
Compete 0.2210*** 0.1787*** 0.0996 0.0162  0.1824*** 0.1484*** 0.064 0.0186*   
 (0.0258) (0.0318) (0.3548) (0.0102)  (0.0164) (0.0276) (0.2555) (0.0094) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.0989*** 0.1124*** 1.7525*** 0.0701***  0.0933*** 0.1163*** 1.4159*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0272) (0.3581) (0.0171)  (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.2499) (0.0155) 
Public -0.0068 -0.0820* 3.4779*** 0.0174  -0.0126 -0.0306 1.0896** 0.0074 
 (0.0350) (0.0471) (0.9105) (0.0207)  (0.0241) (0.0313) (0.5145) (0.0139) 
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Company -0.0044 0.0063 3.3824*** 0.0045  -0.0004 0.0776*** 0.8431* -0.0065 
 (0.0336) (0.0372) (0.6837) (0.0172)  (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.4722) (0.0082) 
          
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
N 102,374 96,359 98,843 105,136  102,374 96,359 98,843 105,136 
R2 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.11  0.14 0.16 0.13 0.19 
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Table 8: AFS and Firm Corruption Obstacle: Institutional Developments 
 
This table reports the impacts of institutional developments on the AFS-corruption relationship. We add three interactions,  AFS*CorruptionControl, 
AFS* GovernmentEffectiveness, and AFS*RuleofLaw to Equation (2). Macro controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. Country fixed effects are included in columns (4) to (6). Standard errors, clustered by country, are reported in parentheses. Detailed 
variable definitions and sources are given in Appendix 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dep. Var. Corruption Obstacle 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
AFS 0.0968* 0.1264** 0.1029*  0.0127 0.0289 0.017 
 (0.0540) (0.0489) (0.0547)  (0.0200) (0.0184) (0.0191) 
AFS*CorruptionControl -0.1139**    -0.0764***                  
 (0.0556)    (0.0252)                  
CorruptionControl -0.4612***    -0.5538**                  
 (0.0802)    (0.2451)                  
AFS*GovernmentEffectiveness  -0.1394**    -0.0636**                 
  (0.0637)    (0.0264)                 
GovernmentEffectiveness  -0.6132***    -0.4107                 
  (0.1301)    (0.3160)                 
AFS*RuleofLaw   -0.1254**    -0.0750*** 
   (0.0580)    (0.0252) 
RuleofLaw   -0.3834***    -0.6217**  
   (0.0965)    (0.2935) 
        
Firm & Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
        
N 102,016 102,016 102,016  102,016 102,016 102,016 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.11  0.22 0.22 0.22 
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Appendix 1: Number and Percent of Audited Firms by Country 
 
Country N Audited  Country N Audited 
 
 





       
Afghanistan* 844 294 35%  Chad* 297 131 44% 
Albania* 977 256 26%  Chile* 2,029 1040 51% 
Angola* 754 102 14%  China* 2,658 1886 71% 
Antigua and Barbuda* 150 79 53%  Colombia* 2,929 1715 59% 
Argentina* 3,077 1994 65%  Congo* 135 84 62% 
Armenia* 728 160 22%  Costa Rica* 528 318 60% 
Azerbaijan* 756 344 46%  Croatia* 1,373 622 45% 
Bahamas* 146 88 60%  Cyprus* 240 168 70% 
Bangladesh* 2,941 1255 43%  Czech Republic* 495 255 52% 
Barbados* 149 124 83%  Djibouti 259 118 46% 
Belarus* 1,224 471 38%  Dominica* 150 72 48% 
Belize* 150 103 69%  Dominican Republic* 701 522 74% 
Benin* 297 182 61%  DRC* 1,208 295 24% 
Bhutan* 503 249 50%  Ecuador* 1,380 755 55% 
Bolivia* 1,331 1034 78%  Egypt* 4,677 3761 80% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina* 1,052 647 62%  El Salvador* 1,757 1532 87% 
Botswana* 606 425 70%  Eritrea 172 143 83% 
Brazil* 1,778 402 23%  Estonia* 536 312 58% 
Bulgaria* 1,578 655 42%  Eswatini* 454 340 75% 
Burkina Faso* 384 195 51%  Ethiopia 1,485 1014 68% 
Burundi 427 115 27%  Fiji* 159 143 90% 
Cambodia* 796 199 25%  Gabon* 167 72 43% 
Cameroon* 703 452 64%  Gambia* 325 108 33% 
Cape Verde 151 55 36%  Georgia* 711 263 37% 
Central African Republic* 148 80 54%  Ghana* 
1,207 611 51% 
*IFRS-adopted country 
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Appendix 1- Continued 
 
Country N Audited  Country N Audited 
 
 





       
Greece* 599 287 48%  Lithuania* 526 183 35% 
Grenada* 152 92 61%  Madagascar* 947 453 48% 
Guatemala* 1,442 958 66%  Malawi* 659 374 57% 
Guinea* 365 71 19%  Malaysia* 966 449 46% 
Guinea Bissau* 158 13 8%  Mali* 1,004 404 40% 
Guyana* 164 150 91%  Malta* 242 220 91% 
Honduras* 1,102 705 64%  Mauritania 386 113 29% 
Hungary* 585 361 62%  Mauritius* 392 247 63% 
India* 9,146 7610 83%  Mexico* 2,895 1327 46% 
Indonesia* 2,730 555 20%  Micronesia 67 17 25% 
Iraq* 744 316 42%  Moldova* 1,054 265 25% 
Israel* 479 448 94%  Mongolia* 1,071 886 83% 
Italy* 750 159 21%  Montenegro* 385 172 45% 
Ivory Coast* 868 300 35%  Morocco 392 205 52% 
Jamaica* 354 270 76%  Mozambique 1,080 460 43% 
Jordan* 1,146 609 53%  Myanmar* 1,164 266 23% 
Kazakhstan* 2,526 590 23%  Namibia* 880 670 76% 
Kenya* 2,424 1909 79%  Nepal* 849 679 80% 
Kosovo* 457 100 22%  Nicaragua* 1,133 566 50% 
Kyrgyz Republic 847 323 38%  Niger* 298 149 50% 
Lao PDR 1,317 309 23%  Nigeria* 4,461 923 21% 
Latvia* 591 332 56%  North Macedonia 723 321 44% 
Lebanon 555 499 90%  Pakistan* 2,043 698 34% 
Lesotho* 295 204 69%  Panama* 950 691 73% 
Liberia* 295 89 30%  Papua New Guinea* 
65 44 68% 
*IFRS-adopted country 
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Appendix 1- Continued 
 
Country N Audited  Country N Audited 
 
 
N1 %   
 
N1 % 
         
Paraguay* 1,322 526 40%  Sweden* 596 573 96% 
Peru* 2,616 901 34%  Tajikistan 1,047 300 29% 
Philippines* 2,579 2268 88%  Tanzania* 1,191 537 45% 
Poland* 953 241 25%  Thailand* 825 210 25% 
Romania* 1,035 399 39%  Timor-Leste* 275 83 30% 
Russia* 6,400 1638 26%  Togo* 304 177 58% 
Rwanda* 450 218 48%  Tonga 148 76 51% 
Samoa 107 77 72%  Trinidad and Tobago* 366 300 82% 
Senegal* 1,100 288 26%  Tunisia 592 464 78% 
Serbia* 1,090 623 57%  Turkey* 4,031 1908 47% 
Sierra Leone* 302 85 28%  Uganda* 1,282 604 47% 
Slovak Republic* 537 282 53%  Ukraine* 1,790 528 29% 
Slovenia* 544 209 38%  Uruguay* 1,556 616 40% 
Solomon Islands 150 129 86%  Uzbekistan* 1,972 528 27% 
South Africa* 937 704 75%  Vanuatu 128 57 45% 
South Sudan 724 208 29%  Venezuela* 789 603 76% 
Sri Lanka* 588 384 65%  Vietnam* 2,032 693 34% 
St. Kitts and Nevis* 148 102 69%  West Bank and Gaza 784 623 79% 
St. Lucia* 150 71 47%  Yemen* 824 276 33% 
St. Vincent and Grenadines* 150 118 79%  Zambia* 1,190 739 62% 
Sudan 610 344 56%  Zimbabwe* 1,196 723 60% 
Suriname* 384 237 62%  Total 
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Appendix 2: Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources 
 
Data Sources: WBES = World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES); WDI = World Development Indicators, 
World Bank; WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank; IFS = International Financial 
Statistics. 
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
   
 Key explanatory variable:   
AFS Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s annual financial 
statements were checked and certified by an external 





Dependent variables:  
CorruptionObstacle “How problematic is corruption for the current operations 
of a business?”  No Obstacle =0, Minor Obstacle =1, 
Moderate Obstacle=2, Major Obstacle =3, and Very 
Severe Obstacle=4. 
WBES j30f 
CorruptionDummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if corruption obstacles 
equal to 2 (moderate), 3 (major), or 4 (very severe), and 0 
otherwise. 
WBES j30f 
LicenseObstacle “How problematic are business licensing and permits for 
the current operations of a business?”  No Obstacle =0, 
Minor Obstacle =1, Moderate Obstacle=2, Major 
Obstacle =3, and Very Severe Obstacle=4. 
WBES j30c 
CustomsObstacle “How problematic are customs and trade regulations for 
the current operations of a business?”  No Obstacle =0, 
Minor Obstacle =1, Moderate Obstacle=2, Major 
Obstacle =3, and Very Severe Obstacle=4. 
WBES d30b 
TimeonGovernment  "What % of senior management time was spent in dealing 
with govt regulations?" 
WBES j2 
TaxCheckDummy "Over the last 12 months, was this establishment 
inspected by tax officials?" 
WBES j3 
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Appendix 2- Continued 
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
   
 Firm characteristics:  
FirmSize The natural log of a firm’s permanent, full-time 
employees at end year (t-1)  
WBES l1 
FirmAge The natural log of a firm’s actual age, age=survey year – 
firm founding year  
WBES b5 
Experience “How many years of experience working in this sector 
does the top manager have?” 
WBES b7 
Government Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm is owned by 
government/ state, 0 otherwise. 
WBES b2c 
Foreign Dummy variable that equals 1 if any foreign company or 
individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the 
firm, 0 otherwise. 
WBES b2b 
Compete Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm answered ‘Yes’ 
to the question: “Does this establishment compete against 
unregistered or informal firms?” 
WBES e11 
Exporter Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an exporter, 0 
otherwise.  
WBES d3c 
CapitalExpenditure Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm purchased fixed 
assets, such as machinery, vehicles, equipment, land or 
buildings at year (t-1), and 0 otherwise. 
WBES k4 
Public Legal status of the firm is shareholding company with 
traded shares 
WBES b1 
Company Legal status of the firm is shareholding company with 
non-traded shares 
WBES b1 
NonCompany Legal status of the firm includes sole proprietorship, 
partnership, limited partnership and other 
WBES b1 
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Appendix 2- Continued 
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
   
 Country-level variables:  
Ln_GDP The natural log of GDP in constant 2000 US$ WDI 
Ln_GDP per capita The natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ WDI 
GDPGrowth GDP growth rate WDI 
Inflation  The natural log difference of consumer prices WDI 
PrivateCredit Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. IFS 
CorruptionControl  Country-level corruption estimate and ranges from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance WGI 
GovernmentEffectiveness Country-level estimate for the quality of public services. 
It ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance 
WGI 
RuleofLaw Country-level estimate for rule of society, contract 
enforcement, property rights, et al. It ranges from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance 
WGI 
GovernmentIntegrity A measure of government integrity. The score ranges 
from 0 to 100, with 100 being the best. 
The Heritage 
Foundation 
FinancialFreedom An estimate of banking efficiency. The score ranges from 
0 to 100, with 100 being the freest. 
The Heritage 
Foundation 
BusinessFreedom An estimate of the business freedom. The score ranges 
from 0 to 100, with 100 being the freest. 
The Heritage 
Foundation 
LegalEnglish Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country's legal origin 
is English, 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
LegalFrench Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country's legal origin 
is French, 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
LegalNordic Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country's legal origin 
is Nordic, 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
LegalGerman Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country's legal origin 
is German, 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
LegalSocial Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country's legal origin 
is Socialist, 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 




Individualism A measure of a country's people who feel independent as 
a member of the society.  
Hofstede 
Insights 
UncertaintyAvoidance A measure of a country's tolerance of uncertainty. Hofstede 
Insights 
Masculinity A measure of a country's endorsement of the use of force.  Hofstede 
Insights 
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Appendix 3: The RDD Analysis 
Panel A: Testing corruption obstacles around the threshold without control variables 
 
Dep. Var. CO Coef. Std z-score p-value Bandwidth 





0.535 0.310 1.73 0.08 +/- 2 
1.314 0.806 1.63 0.10 +/- 4 
0.684 0.460 1.49 0.14 +/- 6 
0.403 0.341 1.18 0.24 +/- 8 





0.454 0.310 1.47 0.14 +/- 2 
2.015 0.806 2.50 0.01 +/- 4 
1.480 0.460 3.21 0.00 +/- 6 
0.952 0.341 2.79 0.01 +/- 8 
      
Bias-corrected RD 
estimates with robust 
variance estimator 
0.454 0.265 1.71 0.09 +/- 2 
2.015 1.487 1.36 0.18 +/- 4 
1.480 0.960 1.54 0.12 +/- 6 
0.952 0.619 1.54 0.12 +/- 8 
            
 
Panel B: Testing corruption obstacles around the threshold with control variables 
 
Dep. Var. CO Coef. Std z-score p-value Bandwidth 





0.430 0.314 1.37 0.17 +/- 2 
1.154 0.782 1.48 0.14 +/- 4 
0.328 0.451 0.73 0.47 +/- 6 
0.133 0.326 0.41 0.68 +/- 8 





0.359 0.314 1.15 0.25 +/- 2 
1.826 0.782 2.34 0.02 +/- 4 
1.472 0.451 3.27 0.00 +/- 6 
0.465 0.326 1.43 0.15 +/- 8 
      
Bias-corrected RD 
estimates with robust 
variance estimator 
0.359 0.269 1.34 0.18 +/- 2 
1.826 1.450 1.26 0.21 +/- 4 
1.472 0.926 1.59 0.11 +/- 6 
0.465 0.593 0.78 0.43 +/- 8 
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Internet Appendix for  
 
“The Dark Side of Transparency in Developing Countries: 





This online appendix provides robustness tests and employee threshold information for the RDD analysis 
described in “The Dark Side of Transparency in Developing Countries: The Link between Financial 
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Table IA1. Robustness Tests – Using Corruption Dummy 
 
This table reports the impacts of AFS on an alternative measure of corruption obstacles, Corruption 
Dummy. The OLS regression results are reported in Columns (1) and (3), while Ordered Probit regression 
results are reported in Columns (2) and (4). Macro controls, industry and year fixed effects are included 
in all regressions. Country fixed effects are included in Columns (3) and (4). Standard errors, clustered by 
country, are reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Appendix 2. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 











     
                
 
AFS 0.0457*** 0.1198*** 
 
















Ln Firm Age 0.0117** 0.0318** 
 




















































Capital Expenditure 0.0187 0.0518 
 
0.0210* 0.0637**  
 








Public -0.0104 -0.0257 
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Table IA2. Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Thresholds 
 
This table presents employee threshold for the audit requirements of financial statements. We collect all 
employee threshold information from the website of the International Federation of Accountants, the 
legal and regulatory environment section (https://www.ifac.org/). Threshold determination examples:  
 
Greece: Greece’s accounting Law 4449/2017 stipulates that “Under the law, all public interest entities and 
all companies that meet two of the following criteria for two consecutive years are subject to mandatory 
statutory audits: (i) total assets of EU 4,000,000; (ii) net turnover of EU 8,000,000; and (iii) average 
employees of 50 for the year.” 
The Greece law requires enterprises to be audited when certain criteria are met. One criterion is the 
average employees of 50 for the year. We hence set the threshold to 50. 
 
Hungary: “Companies surpassing both of the following thresholds must undergo a statutory audit: (i) the 
annual net sales (calculated for the period of one year) exceed HUF 300 million on the average of the two 
financial years preceding the financial year under review and (ii) the average number of people employed 
by the undertaking exceed 50 people on the average of the two financial years preceding the financial 
year under review.” 




Country Survey year(s) Total obs. Threshold 
Albania 2007, 2013, 2019 1,041 251 
Benin 2009, 2016 300 51 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009, 2013, 2019 1,083 50 
Bulgaria 2007, 2009, 2013 1,596 51 
Burkina Faso 2009 394 51 
Cambodia 2013, 2016 845 101 
Cameroon 2009, 2016 724 51 
Croatia 2007, 2013, 2019 1,397 51 
Cyprus 2019 240 51 
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Czech Republic 2009, 2013 504 50 
Fiji 2009 164 51 
Georgia 2008, 2013 733 251 
Greece 2018 600 50 
Hungary 2009, 2013 601 51 
Italy 2019 760 20 
Ivory Coast 2009, 2016 887 51 
Kenya 2007, 2013, 2018 2,439 251 
Kosovo 2009, 2013 472 51 
Latvia 2009, 2013 607 51 
Lebanon 2013 561 26 
Lithuania 2009, 2013 546 51 
Moldova 2009, 2013, 2019 1,083 51 
Mongolia 2009, 2013, 2019 1,082 200 
Montenegro 2009, 2013, 2019 416 51 
Mozambique 2007, 2018 1,080 501 
North Macedonia 2009, 2013 726 51 
Papua New Guinea 2015 65 101 
Poland 2009, 2013 997 50 
Romania 2009, 2013 1,081 51 
Rwanda 2006, 2011 453 51 
Senegal 2007, 2014 1,107 51 
Serbia 2009, 2013, 2019 1,109 51 
Sierra Leone 2009, 2017 302 51 
Slovak Republic 2009, 2013 543 31 
Slovenia 2009, 2013 546 50 
Sri Lanka 2011 610 1000 
Suriname 2010, 2018 385 51 
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Togo 2009, 2016 305 51 
Tunisia 2013 592 10 
Turkey 2008, 2013, 2019 4,159 201 
Ukraine 2008, 2013 1,853 51 
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